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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jonathan Ross Mathews pleaded guilty to trafficking in marijuana,
reserving the right to appeal the district court's order denying his motion to
suppress. Mathews timely appeals, challenging that adverse ruling.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Corporal Bingham of the Idaho State Police pulled over Jonathan Ross
Mathews for speeding in Twin Falls County, Idaho. (R., p. 9; 8/28/12 Tr., p. 17,
Ls. 12-13.)

As Mathews gathered his driver's license and registration, and

searched for his proof of insurance, Bingham asked where Mathews was going
and where he had been. (R., p. 9.) Mathews said he had gone to Reno, Nevada
to gamble, and was going to Cheyenne, Wyoming then Lincoln, Nebraska before
heading home to Lawrence, Kansas. (R., p. 9.) Bingham noticed several fivehour energy drink bottles and food wrappers, as well as a road atlas, in Mathews'
car. (R., p. 9; 8/28/12 Tr., p. 19, L. 18- p. 21, L. 13.) Mathews did not appear to
be under the influence of any controlled substances. (8/28/12 Tr., p. 78, Ls. 1215.)
When Bingham asked Mathews if he had any controlled substances in the
car, Mathews removed his sunglasses, looked Bingham directly in the eye and
responded "no," then faced forward, putting his glasses back on. (8/28/12 Tr., p.
51, L. 11 - p. 57, L. 1.) Based on his drug interdiction training, Bingham found
that the atlas, the energy drinks and food wrappers, Mathews' 100+ mile detour
to Twin Falls en route from Reno to Cheyenne, and odd behavior were indicative
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of criminal activity. (R., p. 9; 8/28/12 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 5-16; p. 22, Ls. 9-24; p. 75,
Ls. 4-15.) Accordingly, Bingham called for assistance from the K9 unit. (R., p. 9;
8/28/12 Tr., p. 75, Ls. 4-15.)
Deputy Hoop arrived with a canine. (R., p. 10.) The dog did a free-air
sniff around Bingham's car and alerted to the trunk. (R, p. 10.) When Bingham
searched the trunk, he found roughly 23 packages of marijuana weighing roughly
25 pounds total. (8/28/12 Tr., p. 82, L. 19- p. 83, L. 1; R., p. 10.)
Mathews moved to suppress all evidence from his seizure, arguing it was
obtained outside the permissible scope of his detention. (R., pp. 52-56.) The
district court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Bingham testified. (See
8/28/12 Tr.)
motion.

The district court entered a memorandum decision denying the

(R., pp. 74-87.)

Mathews entered into a conditional plea agreement,

reserving the right to appeal the district court's order denying his motion to
suppress. (R., pp. 124-25.)
The district court entered judgment, sentencing Mathews to a term of 12
years with three years fixed. (R., pp. 133-38.) Mathews timely appealed. (R.,
pp. 140-43.)
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ISSUES
Mathews states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mathews' motion to
suppress the State's evidence?
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Applying constitutional principles to the facts of this case, did the district court
properly deny Mathews' motion to suppress?

3

ARGUMENT
Applying Constitutional Principles To The Facts Of This Case, The District Court
Properly Denied Mathews' Motion To Suppress
When a decision on a suppression motion is challenged, the appellate
court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584,
_, 301 P.3d 242, 251 (2013). The appellate court first accepts the trial court's
factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, then freely reviews
the application of constitutional principles to those facts.
case are not disputed.

kl

The facts of this

Thus, the Court here need only apply the law to the

agreed facts.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012).

To

conduct an investigatory stop in accord with the Fourth Amendment, police must
have "a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that 'criminal activity
may be afoot .... "' U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion is more than an inchoate hunch
about criminal activity, but must be based on a particularized suspicion considering the totality of circumstances - that the one being stopped is engaged
in wrongdoing. State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 6, 217 P.3d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2009).
Mathews does not assert that his initial stop for speeding was improper.
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) Rather, Mathews challenges the validity of his continued
detention to await the K9 unit's arrival. (Id.) "[W]here officers abandon the initial
purpose of a routine traffic stop and extend it to allow for a drug dog search, the
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extension must be justified by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot." State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405,409, 283 P.3d 722, 726 (2012).
The district court found that Mathews' continued detention to allow the K9
unit to arrive was justified by reasonable suspicion.

(R., pp. 74-87.)

In so

concluding, the district court cited four factors. First, Mathews' car had several
food wrappers and energy drink bottles, giving it a "lived in" appearance and
indicating that Mathews was avoiding any stops. (R., p. 84.) Second, Mathews
was using a map rather than a GPS, which Bingham testified helps police
discover drug trafficking destinations, and is thus often avoided by drug
traffickers. (R., p. 84.) Third, Mathews' travel plans were suspicious because
his route was very circuitous, and his responses to Bingham's questions failed to
explain his detour.

(R., pp. 84-85.)

Finally, Mathews' way of responding to

Bingham's question about drugs was odd. (R., p. 85.) Taken as a whole, the
district court reasoned, Bingham's suspicions justified Mathews' detention. (R.,
pp. 86-87.) Also, citing Exhibit 2, the district court noted that Mathews' detention,
from initial stop to when the canine was deployed, was 21 minutes - a
reasonable duration. (R., pp. 75, 79, 86-87.)
The state hereby adopts the district court's reasoning as set forth in its
decision, attached here as Appendix A.

(R., pp. 74-87.)

considerations, Mathews has failed to show error.
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Given these

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Mathews' judgment of
conviction, and the district court's order denying Mathews' motion to suppress
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2013.

~Nif=ff=

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of July, 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

~(~
Deputy Attorney General
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Case No. CR 2012-6840

MEMORANDUM
DECISION RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Evidence
was presented to the court on Tuesday, August 28, 2012, and on Friday, August 31,
2012. The defendant was personally present during these hearings and was represented
by counsel, George Essma.

Jill Sweesy represented the state.

The Court has reviewed

the materials submitted by the parties, researched the applicable law and heard oral
argument. The motion for suppression of the evidence is DENIED.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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FINDINGS OF FACT

At approximately 1:27 p.m. on June 7, 2012, Trooper Aaron Bingham (Bingham)
was on patrol for the Idaho State Police, working on U.S. Highway 93 in Twin Falls
County. He was traveling southbound as he observed a white passenger car travelling
northbound. Bingham estimated the vehicle's speed exceeded the sixty-mile-per-hour
speed limit, traveling approximately sixty-five miles-per-hour. Bingham confirmed
with radar the vehicle was traveling sixty-six miles-per-hour. Bingham initiated a
traffic stop of the vehicle, which was licensed in Kansas.
Just prior to stopping Mathews' vehicle, the video recorder in Bingham's patrol
vehicle automatically activated and recorded 1 the entirety of the stop. The video also
includes the date and time information in the display.
The recording showed that the time of the stop was 13:27:20, and the time that
Bingham approached Mathews was 13:27:40. Bingham approached the vehicle on the
driver's side and asked for documentation, including the driver's license, registration
and insurance. Ultimately Bingham identified the driver as Jonathan Ross Mathews
(Mathews), the defendant herein. Mathews wore sunglasses throughout his discussions
with Bingham, except for a brief period that will be discussed herein. There were no
other occupants in the vehicle.

1 The

video recording was admitted by stipulation (Exhibit 2).

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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While Bingham was waiting for Mathews' to provide the requested information,
Bingham observed food wrappers on the passenger seat and floor board of the car.
Bingham observed several five-hour energy drinks or containers from such drinks in
the console and in the front passenger area of the car. Bingham also observed an atlas,
opened to the map for Idaho.
While at the door of the car, Bingham spoke with Mathews in a conversational
way, asking about where Mathews had been, and where he was going. Mathews
indicated he was coming from Reno and heading to Cheyenne Wyoming. By 13:29:15
Bingham asked whether there were any controlled substances of any kind in the
vehicle. Mathews answered in the negative. Bingham asked about marijuana,
methampheatmine and cocaine, and at this point Mathews removed his sunglasses,
stared straight into Bingham's eyes and again answered in the negative. This
movement bothered Bingham and he characterized it as something that appeared
staged. At 13:29:24 Mathews indicates that his insurance is "outdated" and he keeps
looking for a current proof of insurance.
While Mathews looked for more information, Bingham and Mathews continue to
converse. Mathews indicated that he was staying at the Shilo Inn in Reno and that he
had gambled in a gas station. When Bingham asks, "so you went all the way across the
country to gamble at a gas station"? (at 13:30:16), Mathews makes an inaudible
response, other than what this court could hear repeated by Bingham as "blackjack."
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Bingham asked further questions based upon Mathews' answers. During
Bingham's conversation with Mathews he learned that Mathews had traveled cross
country from Kansas to Reno to gamble. Mathews was on his return trip, coming from
Reno, Nevada, and heading to Cheyenne Wyoming, then back to Kansas via Lincoln,
Nebraska. Mathews never indicated that he had a purpose to be traveling towards
Twin Falls, Idaho.
Bingham has training in drug interdiction. He has attended courses, in addition
to standard and advanced POST training, that qualify him to offer opinions regarding
indicia of potential drug trafficking. His classes included a "Desert Snow" class
conducted in Pendelton, Oregon, and a ride-along with an interdiction officer in Utah.
The court finds that Bingham is qualified through his training, experience and
specialized knowledge to offer expert opinions pursuant to I.R.E. 702. The court further
finds that Bingham's training, experience and specialized knowledge enabled him to
form conclusions based upon his observations and the brief conversation while
standing at the driver's side door of Mathews' vehicle.
Bingham noted certain things that he looks for when detecting possible drug
trafficking cases. Those include people on long trips, stories that are not plausible,
energy drinks and pills of different sorts. Bingham indicated that he looks for cars with
a "lived-in look" because drug traffickers are on the go, not stopping much.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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Accordingly, maps, atlases, and people going out of their way on travel routes to
possibly avoid an area are suspect.
Bingham was eventually provided with proper insurance documentation and he
returned to his patrol car at approximately 13:30:45. Based upon his observations,
Bingham began, almost immediately attempting to locate a canine officer to come to his
location. Bingham was aware that the local canine officers were involved in training at
Filer High School, approximately 4-5 miles from where this stop occurred. Because the
officers were in training, Bingham began dialing the officers directly on his cell phone at
13:31:15 rather than using ISP dispatch to do so. After two officers expressed an
inability to respond, Bingham reached Deputy Hoop of the Twin Falls County Sheriff's
office at 13:35:30. Deputy Hoop indicated that he was at the training, but that he would
break away and bring his certified canine to conduct a free-air sniff.
Shortly before speaking with Hoop on the telephone, Bingham had a brief
discussion with another Idaho State Police officer, Trooper DeBie, who had arrived on
the scene. Trooper DeBie thereafter spoke with Mathews while Bingham was on the
telephone. DeBie2 testified at the hearing, but his conversation at the scene was not
presented to the court by way of a recording.
At 13:36:19 Bingham submitted information to dispatch regarding Mathews so
that Mathews' personal information could be verified. Bingham also entered such

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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•
information in his computer located in his vehicle. Bingham requested dispatch run a
driver's check, a warrants check, and "triple I," which is a report designed to detect
potential drug trafficking or movement, including a detailed criminal history on the
potential suspect.
Deputy Hoop arrived at approximately 13:44. Bingham informed Hoop what he
had learned in his conversation with Mathews. Hoop then approached Mathews at
approximately 13:45 and conversed with Mathews for approximately one minute.
Hoop then deployed his canine at 13:46:48.
During a free-air sniff by the canine, the dog indicated that narcotics were
located in Mathews' vehicle at approximately 13:48:08. In the course of the search
based on the dog's signal , the officers located approximately twenty-five (25) pounds of
marijuana hidden in the trunk of Mathews' car.
Mathews urges this court to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the traffic
stop, asserting the officer illegally extended the duration of the stop by asking questions
about Mathews' travel, destinations, and drugs, and by waiting for the drug dog to
arrive. The state asserts that the extension was necessary to complete the purpose of the
traffic stop.

DeBie's information came after Bingham had decided to contact a canine officer; therefore, this court concludes
that his observations and testimony do not aid the court in making its determinations in this case.
2
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ANALYSIS
I.

Trooper Bingham's Questions about Drug Activity and Mathews'
Travel History did not Unreasonably Delay the Traffic Stop.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of
the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.3 The purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is "to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of
discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order to
'safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions."' State v.

Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 888, 187 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Ct.App.2008) (quoting Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1291, 1395-96 (1979)). "Stopping an automobile and
detaining its occupants constitutes a' seizure' even if the purpose of the stop is limited
and the detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54, 99 S.Ct. at 1395-96;

State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235,237,880 P.2d 265,267 (Ct.App.1994). An investigative
detention "must be justified by a reasonable suspicion, derived from specific articulable
facts, that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime." Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983); State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848,853, 11 P.3d 44, 49
(Ct.App.2000).

3 Although Mathews contends that both the Idaho and United States constitutions were violated, he provides no
cogent reason why Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution should be differently applied in this case.
Therefore, this court relies on judicial interpretation of the Fourth amendment in its analysis of Mathews' claims.
See State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130, 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct.App. 1999).
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Although a vehicle stop is limited in magnitude compared to other types of
seizures, it is nonetheless a constitutionally cognizable" intrusion and therefore may
II

not be conducted "at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials." Prouse, 440
U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1397. Because a traffic stop is limited in scope and duration, it is
analogous to an investigative detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). See State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 181 P.3d
1249 (Ct.App.2008).
''During the course of a lawful traffic stop, general questioning on topics
unrelated to the purpose of the stop is permissible as long as it does not expand the
duration of the stop." Ramirez, 145 Idaho at 889, 187 P.3d at 1264. Moreover, "[bJrief,
general questions about drugs and weapons, in and of themselves, do not extend an
otherwise lawful detention." Id. at 890, 187 P.3d at 1265. Here, this court finds that the
brief, general questions, which Bingham asked about Mathews' route of travel, where
he stayed in Reno, where he gambled, where he was going and whether there were any
drugs in the car, were not improper for two reasons. First, Bingham initially asked his
questions while he was waiting for a correct proof of insurance. These questions, then,
did not delay the stop in any way. Second, even if the questions came after proper
insurance had been provided, the very brief detention thereafter to ask questions was
proper. Again, as set forth by the Court in Ramirez:
During [the] Trooper['s] first encounter with Ramirez, he asked
Ramirez for his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
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Trooper Bennett inquired into Ramirez's destination, where he was
coming from, and the circumstances under which he came to be driving
the van. These questions about destination and ownership were
legitimately posed by Trooper Bennett to investigate the traffic stop.
Trooper Bennett then asked Ramirez how many pounds of
methamphetamine he was transporting and repeated the question as to
marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. Although these additional questions about
drugs were direct and specific, rather than general in nature, they were
not impermissible.
Id. at 890, 187 P.3d at 1265.

The Court concluded that the Trooper's few questions about destination,
ownership of the vehicle and drugs were asked in a matter of seconds and were
objectively reasonable. Similarly, Bingham's questioning, while also observing the
wrappers, energy drinks, and atlas, were objectively reasonable given the answers
Mathews was giving him, and what Bingham has been trained to observe in drug
interdiction work. These questions were not impermissible according to Ramirez,
above. 4
Therefore, the traffic stop was not impermissibly delayed by the questions
Bingham asked Mathews. Thus, the court denies Mathews' motion insofar as it relates
to the questions posed by Bingham.

4 It is somewhat unclear when Mathews provided proper insurance. Bingham testified to points their conversation
where Bingham was asking questions and had not yet received the proof of insurance. However, the testimony was
unclear as to the precise point in which Bingham received adequate insurance documentation-whether it was
before or after the drug-related questions.
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II.

Trooper Bingham had Reasonable Suspicion to Delay the Stop to
Obtain a Drug Dog.

The actions taken by Bingham after obtaining information from Mathews did not
irnperrnissibly delay the stop. Any routine traffic stop might turn up suspicious
circumstances that could justify an officer asking further questions unrelated to the
stop. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608,613, 798 P.2d 453,458 (Ct.App.1990). "The officer's
observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may-and often dogive rise to legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further
investigation by an officer." State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886,889, 187 P.3d 1261, 1264
(Ct.App. 2008). Accordingly, the length and scope of the initial investigatory detention
may be lawfully expanded if there exist objective and specific articulable facts that
justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in
criminal activity. Id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently set forth the analytical framework for issues
like those Mathews presents here in State v. Ramirez, id. Regarding potential extensions
of an investigative detention the Court noted:
An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer
than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. . . . There is no rigid
time-limit for determining when a detention has lasted longer than
necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the detention and the
law enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the stop.
. . . Where a person is detained, the scope of detention must be carefully
tailored to its underlying justification.... The scope of the intrusion
permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. . . . However, brief inquiries not otherwise
MEMORANDUM DECISION
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related to the initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a
detainee's Fourth Amendment rights.... Any routine traffic stop might
turn up suspicious circumstances that could justify an officer asking
further questions unrelated to the stop .... The officer's observations, general

inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may-and often do-give rise to
legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further investigation by
an officer. Accordingly, the length and scope of the initial investigatory detention
may be lawfully expanded if there exist objective and specific articulable facts that
justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in
criminal activity.
145 Idaho at 889, 187 P.3d at 1264 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The question here is whether II objective and specific articulable facts" existed
that justified Bingham's extension of the stop to obtain the services of a drug dog. This
court holds that such facts exist here.
There were various factors that gave Bingham reasonable suspicion. First,
Bingham was trained to look for the things that he saw in Mathews' vehicle: food
wrappers, energy drinks-generally, an appearance of a car being "lived in" and that
the driver was in a hurry to arrive at his destination.
Second, Bingham saw a map of Idaho on the passenger seat. Bingham testified
that traffickers prefer maps and atlases instead of GPS systems because GPS systems
require destination information that could lead the police to other suspects or more
evidence if the police catch a trafficker in route.
Third, Mathews' travel plans were suspect. When asked about where he came
from and what he was doing there, Mathews told Bingham that he drove cross-
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country from Kansas to Reno, Nevada, to gamble in a gas station. 5 When Bingham
asked Mathews where he was headed, Mathews said he was traveling to Kansas from
Reno, via Cheyenne and Lincoln. Bingham knew that the most direct route from Reno
to Cheyenne was on Interstate 80 through Utah-a section of interstate that is wellknown for being patrolled for drug trafficking and could compel a trafficker to go far
out of his way to avoid detection there. 6 7
Fourth, Bingham's suspicion was further triggered by Mathews' odd way of
answering Bingham's questions about drugs by removing his sunglasses, looking
Bingham in the eye and answering, then putting the sunglasses back on.
The reasonableness of the officer's suspicion must be evaluated based upon the
totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90
P.3d at 931. This standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere
speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. "An officer may draw reasonable
inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn
from the officer's experience and law enforcement training." Id.

5 The court notes, as Bingham also noted, that Kansas is to the east of Nevada and Reno is on the western side of
Nevada. Therefore, not only did Mathews' story make it seem that he drove across the country to gamble at a gas
station, but he had also traveled across the entire state of Nevada to gamble at a gas station.
6 Mathews argued that his detour from a direct route to Cheyenne should not be factored into reasonable suspicion as
he could have been heading to Twin Falls for am~ of reasons. However, the court finds that argument
unsupported by the facts. When the officer asked where Mathews was heading, he said ''Cheyenne." The court
believes it is reasonable to presume that had he been heading to Twin Falls-for example, to visit a friend-the
answer would have been "Twin Falls." By Mathews' own answer, he was driving to Cheyenne and not anywhere in
southern Idaho.
7 The unexplained detour was even more suspicious when combined with the items visible in Mathews' car-energy
drinks, food wrappers, and an atlas- that appeared to show he was in a hurry to reach his destination.
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As this court has already noted, Bingham had training in drug interdiction, in the
things to look for and the questions to ask a detainee regarding drug use, travel
destinations, routes, etc. The answers given and the objectively reasonable facts visible
to Bingham at the time of the stop support the suspicion necessary to take further action
and to investigate the activity that was afoot. This court recognizes that suspicion is not
justified if the conduct observed by the officer falls within the broad range of what can
be described as normal driving behavior. Id. While each factor Bingham observed or
found out may be normal individually, the combination of the factors here was not
normal behavior, and was sufficient to trigger reasonable suspicion that a crime had
been, or was about to be committed.
Once this information was either observed or obtained through Mathews'
responses, Bingham had reasonable suspicion that Mathews was transporting drugs. At
that point, Bingham could investigate the crime of drug trafficking and was no longer
bound by the strictures of issuing a speeding ticket. Therefore, from the time, that
Bingham ended his conversation with Mathews at Mathews' window, Bingham had
reasonable suspicion of drug activity and was permitted to investigate.
The court notes that from the time of the stop until the drug dog indicated on the
car, approximately twenty-one minutes had elapsed. See State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho
913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that being detained for forty-nine
minutes from the beginning of a traffic stop to a drug dog's arrival was reasonable for a
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diligent investigation by officers). Therefore, Bingham's actions in investigating his
suspicion were efficient and reasonable.
Bingham had reasonable suspicion and acted on that suspicion reasonably.
CONCLUSION

Bingham had probable cause to stop Mathews for speeding along Highway 93.
Bingham thereafter developed reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to justify
further investigation by summoning a drug dog. The time taken to do so was not
unreasonable. The motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the stop is therefore
DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

_£_ day of September, 2012.

District Judge
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